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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
Due to the growing trends in outsourcing and supply chain initiatives, inter-
organizational control has become an increasingly important issue in today’s business 
world.  Many businesses set up the so-called “partnering” relationship with their key 
suppliers.  The biggest challenge for this relationship is to find the best mechanisms that 
align the supplier’s incentive with that of the buyer’s and still maximize each individual 
firm’s payoff.  The purpose of this paper is to present a stylized profit-sharing contract, 
which is a type of contract commonly adopted to mitigate buyer-supplier incentive 
problems, and contrast several different types of supplier audit associated with it.  
Through the analysis of a dynamic Bayesian game, I find the mixed strategy audit in such 
a contract weakly dominates all other audit methods. 
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1. Introduction 
Supply chain advocates often say “collaborate or die”, however, an article in 
Harvard Business Review  (Narayanan and Raman, 2004) reports that “companies often 
complain…that their supply chain partners don’t seem to want to do what is in 
everyone’s best interests, even when it’s obvious what’s best for the supply chain.”  The 
authors point out that the root of such a problem is misaligned incentives between/among 
supply chain member companies, mainly due to certain informational asymmetries such 
as hidden action (e.g. the manufacturer cannot observe whether the retailer is trying hard 
to sell its products) or hidden information (e.g. the OEM does not know the true cost of 
its vendors).  The article further suggests a good way to improve the situation is through 
better designed incentive contracts.  
Why are incentive problems in supply chain context such a serious issue?  In a 
market that is perfectly competitive, incentive problems pose a much smaller threat than 
in a market containing only a few players because competition can help resolve them.  
Perfect competition leads to an efficient price system, which significantly reduces 
problems associated with private information.  Auction theory demonstrates the more 
bidders there are, the closer the bidding price will get to the bidder’ unobservable true 
valuation (McAfee & McMillan 1987).  This means if there are plenty of suppliers 
associated with one buyer, their competition with each other will compete down/away the 
potential information rent they can earn should there be only one or a few of them.   
However, the common practice for many companies today is not to buy from 
perfectly competitive supply market, but to set up long-term “partnering” relationship 
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with their key suppliers, especially suppliers of highly customized products or 
components.  The goal of this sort of relationship is to concentrate on core competency, 
reduce transaction cost, improve risk allocation to create “win-win” outcome.  As a result, 
the number of suppliers significantly decreases as the level of integration between the 
supplier and buyer increases.  For example, a study by Nishiguchi (1993) on automotive 
industry shows that North American automakers on average employ only 1.30 suppliers 
for major components, indicating a strong trend of single sourcing.  The same applies to 
the suppliers – they typically serve only 3.6 regular customers with the biggest customer 
accounting for 79.9% of their total sales.  The products are very customized to one major 
customer with the number of customers buying a particular component model being a 
mere 1.30.  Similar examples can be easily found in government contracting, computer 
hardware industry, healthcare industry and so on.  
Due to the significant amount of relationship-specific investment (such as R&D, 
marketing, human capital)1 in supply chain context, the relationship between the buyer 
and supplier is effectively transformed into one that is bilateral monopolistic.  As a result, 
the conventional market with perfect competition turns into a principal-agent relationship.  
A buyer faces only one or a few supplier(s) can no longer afford to ignore the existing 
incentive problems.  She often has to take up the role of the principal and design certain 
contracts to incentivize the supplier(s) with private information.  The optimal thing to do 
for a supplier that is given no incentive plan is to exert no effort or misreport cost 
                                                 
1 Williamson (1985) calls it the “fundamental transformation” – once two parties start a transaction they 
become more likely to transact with each other in the future than with other potential candidates in the 
market. 
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information2.  That is why contracts with a profit-sharing feature are so commonly-
observed in many industries characterized with a thin supplier market.  Laffont and Tirole 
(2002) sort the types of contracts by their “powers” of incentive: on one extreme is the 
fixed price contract, which makes the supplier the residual claimant and provides highest 
power of incentive; on the other extreme is the cost-plus contract, which makes the buyer 
the residual claimant and provides the lowest power of incentive; in between are various 
levels of profit-sharing contracts that are of intermediate incentive power.   
Nishiguchi (1993) reports about 45% of the automakers in North America use 
profit-sharing contracts with their major suppliers; and the average sharing ratio is around 
50-50.  The profit/savings being shared usually comes from the difference between 
targeted cost and the actual cost achieved.  Government contractors and many 
government-regulated industries have been given profit-sharing contracts for a long time.  
Laffont and Tirole (2002) provide a detailed survey of government procurement contracts.  
They state profit-sharing contracts have been growing rapidly since the 1980’s instead of 
the traditional “cost-plus” method.  Reichelstein (1992) quote a 1987 U.S. General 
Accounting Office survey which claim the firms’ cost sharing ratio varies between 15% 
and 25%.  Retail industry has also been observed to use a so-called “revenue-sharing” 
contract with the retailer and the supplier sharing the final revenue at an agreed ratio 
(Cachon 2001).  The goal of such contracts is to incentivize the retailer to sell more of the 
                                                 
2 Why do suppliers cheat by padding/over-reporting the costs?  Laffont and Tirole (2002) summarize that 
there are only two causes.  The first cause is the trade-off between incentive and information rent; the 
second being that the buyer’s desire to extract more rent from the supplier.  Informational asymmetry is the 
key problem in profit-sharing arrangements, as the party with informational advantage can easily gain extra 
profit in addition to the agreed amount by not disclosing the private information. The “rent-seeking” 
behavior is essential to economic agents. As a result, the presence of private information often makes it 
impossible to achieve first-best outcome. 
 3
products supplied by the supplier while helping coordinate the inventory problem within 
the supply chain.  Even in Hollywood, the motion picture industry has been using profit-
sharing contracts traced back to the silent era (Weinstein, 1998). 
Profit-sharing agreements serve to align incentives between the buyer and the 
supplier in a supply chain. They encourage relationship-specific investment and minimize 
shirking behavior.  In an environment with uncertainty, profit-sharing also entails sharing 
of risks.  As the above examples show, the actual arrangement can take different forms 
such as profit-sharing, savings-sharing (target costing), revenue sharing, and so on.  
However, they are all the same incentive scheme using but different contract parameters 
convenient for the industry.  
A necessary condition for profit-sharing is open-book costing/pricing with 
associated audit/review rights.  For profit-sharing between two parties to make sense, the 
cost data has to be transparent for the negotiation.  Without the complete and “truthful” 
cost information, it is impossible to agree on any profit sharing ratio.  Open-book costing 
simply grants the buyer access to the details of each cost component of the supplier’s 
product/service, including materials, direct labor, overhead, etc.  It also often gives the 
buyer rights to offer recommendations to the supplier on how costs can be further 
reduced.  Of course always attached is the auditing or reviewing of the shared cost 
information as a mechanism to verify the accuracy of the information.  The inaccuracy 
can come from both innocent clerical mistakes and purposeful data manipulation.  Profit-
sharing contracts often have detailed provisions on open-book terms and audit/review 
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requirements.  A typical such provision should include3: description of what is meant by 
"open book pricing";  relationship between pricing structure and open book pricing; 
umber and types of reviews/audits that may be made in any year of the open book records; 
reconciliation procedures if any review or audit shows that charges are not as required 
under the charging structure and open book provisions; period of time during which open 
book records required to be held; link with any benchmarking provisions in the contract.  
Open-book costing/pricing with associated audit rights is such a useful tool that it 
even often appears in contracts that are not strictly profit-sharing per se4.  In fact, as long 
as the charge is not a fixed price, open-book arrangements with audit rights are always 
good extra protections for the buyer.  They have long been practiced by industries that 
adopt long-term incentive schemes with their suppliers, such as government contracting, 
government-regulated sectors, automotive industry, retail industry, construction industry 
and so on.   
Supplier audit is also a topic worth some elaboration.  Within accounting practice, 
it has always been an important component of internal auditing.  CPA Journal (1995) 
provides a detailed description from a practitioner’s point of view of how supplier audit 
can be conducted.  One article titled Outsourcing’s Hidden Cost from Insurance and 
Technology (2003) tells stories of how suppliers can inflate costs to hide secret profit for 
themselves and how buyers can recoup the lost profit through effective audits.  The tricks 
the suppliers use include delaying time to pass price decreases to their buyers; buying 
cheaper materials and concealing the savings information; or simply taking advantage of 
                                                 
3 Kindly provided by Belinda Doshi, who is a solicitor in the Technology Law Group at law firm Field 
Fisher Waterhouse.  
4 For example, cost-plus contracts often require open-book costing as well.  
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sloppily written contracts.  As an example of a successful supplier audit, Hewlett-Packard 
recovered $30 million in 2001 that it had paid for indirect services more than agreed.   
Governments have even more formal and established supplier audit agencies and 
procedures.  Laffont and Tirole (2002) provide examples of government audit agencies 
such as General Accounting Office in the United States, Exchequer and Audit 
Department in Britain, Cour des Comptes in France and Bundesrechnungshof in 
Germany.  They are very effective tools in monitoring government contractors and 
recovering excessive payments.  A brief summary of DCAA (Defense Contract Audit 
Agency) of their 2004 work shows: “In FY 2004, DCAA audited 10,299 pricing 
proposals with a total dollar value of $148.2 billion. We audited incurred costs and 
special audits during that same period of $112.7 billion.  Approximately $2.1 billion in 
net savings were reported during the year. When compared to the $428.0 million 
expended for the Agency's operations, the return on taxpayers' investment in DCAA was 
$5.00 for each dollar invested.”  
As the above examples show, supplier contracts with features such as profit-
sharing, open-book costing and auditing are an important business practice and worth 
academic investigation.  The purpose of this paper is to present a stylized profit-sharing 
contract with random supplier audit in a game theoretical setting.  I derive the optimal 
sharing ratios and production quantities that should be assigned to the supplier that might 
be of different cost types.  I then contrast this contract with other feasible ones with audit 
probabilities being zero or one as well as evaluate their efficiency and appropriateness of 
use respectively.  I also extend the model by adding a moral hazard element to the 
problem and demonstrate the resultant changes in contract parameters.  
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I find that under profit-sharing contracts with mixed strategy, neither the high-cost 
supplier nor the low-cost supplier earns any informational rent or gets a sharing ratio 
bigger than zero.  Similar to the pure strategy incentive contract with zero auditing, the 
low-cost supplier is assigned with an efficient production quantity. However, the high-
cost supplier’s production quantity is upwardly distorted instead of downwardly distorted 
in the case of pure strategy incentive contracts. I also demonstrate that when the penalty 
imposed on the supplier increases or when the cost of audit for the buyer decreases to a 
certain value, the contract with random auditing dominates the pure strategy contract with 
zero auditing and the buyer’s profit gets closer to the first-best result.  When the moral 
hazard problem is added to the model, the optimal sharing ratios are no longer zero due to 
the risk-incentive tradeoff.  
This study contributes to the existing literature of supply chain research by 
modeling and analyzing a type of commonly-seen supplier contracts involving profit 
sharing and supplier auditing. Unlike the well-known pure strategy incentive contracts 
that do not need auditing, the model in this paper employs a mixed strategy and allows 
cheating and ex-post auditing to occur in equilibrium. The findings of this study can 
provide some explanation and useful insights to the designing of supplier contracts.  
Furthermore, the results can also be generalized beyond the buyer-supplier context.  
The rest of this paper consists of four sections. Section 2 provides a review of the 
related literature. Section 3 presents the basic model and characterizes the solution. 
Section 4 contrasts the model to the first-best scenario, the contract with zero auditing 
and the contract with deterministic auditing. Section 5 extends the model by adding a 
moral hazard element.  Section 6 concludes the study.
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2. Literature Review 
 The topic of this study relates to the following two streams of research: supply 
chain management and auditing. 
2.1. Incentives in Supply Chain Management 
Traditional research in supply chain management often assumes symmetric 
information. However, incentives are an important issue in supply chain practice and 
research. The supplier can have private information on cost or quality of the product, or 
the buyer can have private information on the market demand. They both could be 
subject to decisions on the amount of investment to make, which can also be affected by 
uncertainty of the environment and lead to the classic “hold-up” problem. In addition, 
unlike government regulating a monopolist that sells products to end-consumers or 
corporate authority coordinating transfer pricing between its two divisions, the buying 
firm in the supply chain is the principal herself.  She does not have administrative power 
over the supplying firm and is only concerned with maximizing her own profit.  
A significant problem facing the supply chain members is incomplete contracting, 
which means that certain variables cannot be contracted on because they are unverifiable5. 
Baiman and Rajan (2001) give a comprehensive review on the incentive problems in 
buyer-supplier relationship and the mechanisms to mitigate them in the framework of 
incomplete contracting. They demonstrate the trade-off between productive efficiency 
and the cost of opportunism and discuss the welfare change through different contracts. 
                                                 
5 Often these variables can be observed by both parties of the contract but cannot be verified by a third 
party in case of dispute. A typical example is the relationship-specific investment made by the parties 
involved. 
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Baiman and Rajan (2004) demonstrate the value of information-sharing and exchange 
through a buyer-supplier setting, in which the buyer has an innovation that can improve 
the quality of the product but the supplier may misappropriate this information if it is 
disclosed. 
Moral hazard and adverse selection problems are also common in supply chain 
setting. Baiman et al. (2000) model moral hazard problems involving different types of 
quality costs in the supply chain. Baiman et al. (2001) further examine the contractual 
and incentive issues between the buyer and supplier on product quality issues. Corbett 
and de Groot (2000) derive the optimal quantity discount policy under asymmetric cost 
information.  
There is also a stream of research that uses game-theoretical setting to model 
asymmetric information in a supply chain. Cachon (2003) and Cachon and Netessine 
(2004) provide examples and a review of supply chain literature on incentive conflicts 
and contract issues. Lim (2001) investigates a buyer’s contract design problem when 
there is incomplete information regarding the quality of the parts delivered by the 
supplier using game theory. 
2.2. Audit   
Audit as a monitoring mechanism is used in many contexts such as monopolist 
regulation, procurement, financial contracting, tax audit and accounting audit. Audits in 
monopolist regulation setting and procurement setting are very similar. They are 
commonly conducted by the government (buyer) to verify the cost/quality information 
reported by the monopolist (supplier). Similar to procurement problem faced by private 
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buyers such as in a supply chain, the government must design mechanisms to reduce the 
potential informational rent earned by the monopolistic supplier. However, unlike private 
buyers, the government is not the actual buyer of the product/service provided by the 
supplier. It is concerned with maximizing the total social welfare including the (weighted) 
sum of producer surplus and consumer surplus, while the principal in the supply chain 
problem only maximizes her own profit. The government also needs to set up correct 
price for the end-consumer and subsidy to the monopolist. 
In financial contracting, a lender such as a bank faces a borrower with private 
information on his own profit/return level. Audit can help the creditor to reveal the 
borrower’s true profit (Townsend 1978; Gale and Hellwig 1985; Williamson 1987). Tax 
auditing has also been analyzed in the principal-agent framework   (Reinganum and 
Wilde 1985; Graetz, Reiganum and Wilde 1986; Scotchmer 1987; Mookherjee and P’ng 
1989).  In these models, income is the tax-payer’s private information and cannot be 
freely observed. The tax authority’s goal is to design optimal tax audit policy for a tax-
payer that strategically chooses his reporting decision. Auditing in accounting is another 
important stream of research related to this paper.  Unlike other audit models, the more 
current accounting audit models often involve three players6: a shareholder-principal with 
two agents, one is a firm manager, the other is an auditor (Demski and Sappington 1984). 
Often the focus of these multi-agent models is collusion between the manager and the 
auditor (Baiman et al. 1991). 
                                                 
6 Early auditing models in accounting did not explicitly model the auditor as a separate economic agent 
with his own incentives (Antle 1982), but more analytical studies seem to have changed from two-player 
game into three-player game. 
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Most of the analytical audit models mentioned above focus on pure strategy 
solutions. For example, Baron and Besanko (1984) set up a scenario in which the 
government conducts an audit to verify the monopolist’s true cost. They derive an 
optimal result where audits are conducted in a deterministic manner as soon as a cost is 
reported above the cut-off value. Similar to the classic adverse selection problem as in 
Baron and Myerson (1982), the Revelation Principle is triggered and there is no cheating 
in equilibrium7. Audit and penalty are included in the contract to ensure truth-telling, but 
the agent will never cheat and no penalty will ever be collected.  
Audit models with mixed strategy have the advantage that it depicts a world with 
cheating.  Reinganum and Wilde (1985) investigate tax compliance through a mixed 
strategy game.  Fellingham and Newman (1985) discuss an auditing game in which the 
auditor and client both use randomized strategies in deciding the audit procedures and the 
amount of effort to exert. Dunne and Loewenstein (1995) present a model including 
auditing with mixed strategy in an auction setting.  Khalil (1997) analyzes auditing 
without commitment. This study also adopts the mixed strategy approach to demonstrate 
the optimal supplier contract in a simple dynamic Bayesian game.
                                                 
7 For a simplified version of their model, see Laffont and Martimort (2002). 
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3. The Model 
3.1. Description of the Game  
In a single period setting, a buyer has to delegate the production of certain product 
to a supplier. The product is highly customized, with no other potential outside buyers or 
sellers. They either transact with each other, or get zero payoffs. The supplier’s marginal 
cost is c , which can only be privately observed by himself. This private cost information 
can be understood to come from the supplier’s technology such as the productivity of his 
equipment, or the specific price discounts his own suppliers offer to him on certain raw 
materials or components. The buyer cannot freely obtain this information. There are two 
possible values of ,  and , with probabilities  and respectively and 
.  The distribution of the probabilities is common knowledge to both the 
buyer and the supplier8. The total cost of the production is 
c Hc Lc Hf Lf  
1=+ HL ff
ii qcC = , where  is the 
quantity of the products being produced.  
q
For simplicity, I assume the buyer does not add any extra value to the product9. 
The buyer sells the product to a market with demand  with , which implies 
the common negative relation between price and demand. The inverse demand function is 
. The price and market demand are assumed to be common knowledge for both the 
buyer and the supplier.  The buyer and the supplier also agree on a certain “profit-
sharing” arrangement.  The buyer reimburses the cost the supplier reported, plus a 
q 0)(' <pq
)(qp
percentage  of the total profit made. So the payment to the supplier will take the form 
                                                
S
 
8 This assumption is reasonable because the buyer usually has enough experience or market knowledge to 
be able to give an estimation of the distribution of the cost even though she doesn’t know the actual value 
taken by the supplier.  
9 The assumption sounds unrealistic, but it does not change any qualitative relation between the variables. 
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cqcqpSq +−)(( . The purpose of the profit-sharing arrangement is to provide incentive
 reduce the cost.  The lower the cost of the product, the lower the price 
the buyer will set, and the more quantity will be sold to the end market.  
The buyer can inspect the supplier’s reported cost through an audi
) s 
for the supplier to
t, and the results 
of the audit can be verified by a third party or a court. The audit can reveal the supplier’s 
true cost without error, but will cost the buyer an amount of money/resource k . If the 
supplier is caught cheating, he will be subject to a penalty UC dd + , where Cd  represen
the amount of penalty that can be collected by the buyer an resents collectible 
penalty such as the supplier’s loss of future business and the potential damage to his 
reputation. However, if the audit shows the supplier being truthful, there is no bonus 
his honesty.  
The pr
ts 
for 
oblem can be described in a simple dynamic Bayesian game.  First nature 
decides
s 
. 
ame, 
d Ud  rep un
 the type of the cost possessed by the supplier. It is only learnt by the supplier.  
The buyer offers a menu of contract for the supplier to choose from.  The menu include
a contract designed for the low-cost supplier and a contract designed for the high-cost 
supplier.  Knowing his true cost, the supplier has two choices: to cheat or to be truthful
By cheating, he simply takes the contract not designed for his cost type; and by being 
truthful he takes the contract corresponding to his cost.  Then production takes place 
corresponding to the contract he takes. Observing the outcome of the production, the 
buyer also has two choices: to audit or to not audit. If the audit is performed and the 
supplier is caught cheating, he has to submit the fine as stipulated. At the end of the g
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the buyer sells the product to the final market and split the gain with the supplier. The 
timeline and the extensive form of game can be demonstrated in figure 1. 
If the buyer’s probability of auditing is α , then the ex-ante contract offered by 
the buyer to the supplier will take the form of { }CLLHH dSqSq ,),,();,( α . This menu of 
contracts include desired production quantities and corresponding profit sharing ratios for 
each type of the two costs, as well as a probability of audit and a fixed amount of penalty 
for supplier’s cheating behavior. The penalty here is assumed to be exogenously 
decided10.  The supplier will choose one contract from the quantity-sharing ratio menu, 
together with the associated audit and penalty.  
Suppose the supplier’s probability of being truthful is t . When the cost is high, he 
chooses to be truthful by producing quantity  with probability , and to cheat by 
producing quantity  with probability 
Hq Ht
Lq Ht−1 . When the cost is low, he chooses to be 
truthful by producing quantity  with probability , and to cheat by producing quantity 
 with probability . The principal does not know the true state of the cost, but she 
anticipates that the supplier might cheat.  She estimates that the probability of the 
supplier reporting high cost and producing quantity  is 
Lq Lt
Hq Lt−1
Hq )1( LLHHH tftf −+=π , and 
the probability of the agent reporting low cost and producing quantity  is Lq
)1( HHLLL tftf −+=π . When she performs her audit, she estimates the probability of 
catching the supplier with low cost pretending to have high cost is 
H
LL
LH
tf
ππ
)1(
|
−= , and 
                                                 
10 For the case of endogenous penalty with limited liability constraint from the supplier’s side, please see 
Laffont and Martimort (2002). 
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Figure 1. Game Tree 
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the probability of catching the supplier with high cost pretending to have low cost is 
L
HH
HL
tf
ππ
)1(
|
−= . The buyer also decides on a probability of audit α . If the audit 
showsthat the supplier is being truthful, the buyer pays him his cost plus the agreed 
percentage of total profit; if the audit shows that the supplier cheats, he has to pay penalty 
 to the buyer and suffer an uncollectible penalty . Cd Ud
I assume a supplier with high cost will not report low cost11, so we can be sure 
that . As a result, the buyer’s estimated probability of the agent reporting low cost 
becomes
1=Ht
LLL tf=π , and the buyer’s estimated probability of the agent reporting high cost 
becomes )1( LLHH tff −+=π . Again since 1=+ HL ff , we know LLH tf−= 1π . It is 
also obvious that when a supplier reports low cost, the buyer will not need to perform an 
audit, so .0=Lα  
3.2. Mixed Strategy 
As pure strategies are simply degenerate forms of mixed strategy, I will first focus 
on the mixed strategy equilibrium of this game.  The problem facing the buyer is hence: 
(1)                                                                       )]))((()([
]})))(()(1([
)))(()(1()({max
||
,,,,,
LLLLLLLLL
HHHHHHLHCLHH
HHHHHHHHHHdSSqq
cqcqpqSqqp
kcqcqpqSd
cqcqpqSqqp
CLHLH
+−−+
−+−−−+
+−−−
π
ππα
απα
 )(1'     )])(()1[(]})))((([
)))((()({max
|
,,,,,
LLLLLHHHHHHCLHH
HHHHHHHHHdSSqq
cqpqSkcqcqpqSd
cqcqpqSqqp
CLHLH
−−+−+−++
+−−=
ππα
πα  
subject to: 
)(IR                                                                                             0))(( H≥− HHHH cqpqS  
                                                 
11 This is indeed a reasonable assumption as will be shown later in the paper. 
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)(IR                                                            0)}(]
))(()[1){(1())((
L≥++−−+
−−−+−
LHucHLHHH
HHHHHLLLLLL
cqddcqcq
cqpqStcqpqSt
α
α
 
(ST)                                                                     )}(]
))(()[1){(1())((maxarg ***
LHucHLHHH
HHHHHLLLLLLtL
cqddcqcq
cqpqStcqpqStt
L
++−−+
−−−+−∈
α
α
 
(BA)                              }]))(([{maxarg |
*
* kqccqpqSd HHHHHHCLHHH
H
−+−+∈ παα α  
 The buyer’s objective function is her expected payoff under the two cost states 
that she estimates. When the reported cost is high, her payoff is her valuation of the 
delivered products minus her payment to the supplier when she does not audit and her 
payment to the supplier when she does audit. When she audits a supplier that reports high 
cost, she pays him the agreed amount if he is found to be truthful and collects a penalty 
 if he is found to be cheating. In either case, she incurs the auditing cost . The buyer 
does not perform audit when the reported cost is low. 
cd k
 The IRH condition is the high-cost supplier’s participation constraint and ensures 
that he enters the contract. The IRL condition is the low-cost supplier’s participation 
constraint. The ST condition is the low-cost supplier’s strategy about being truthful or 
cheating through maximizing his total payoff. The BA condition is the buyer’s auditing 
strategy which maximizes her payoff related to the audit.  
From the FOC of the ST condition, we get:  
(2)                                                                                              )(
]))(()[1())((
LHUCH
LHHHHHHHHLLLL
cqdd
cqcqcqpqScqpqS
++−
−+−−=−
α
α
 
It indicates the low-cost supplier’s payoff if he is truthful equals his payoff if he cheats. 
As a result he should be indifferent between being truthful and cheating. The equation 
can also be written as: 
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(3)                                  
))((
))(())((
UCHHHHHH
LLLLLHHHHHHH
H ddcqcqpqS
cqpqScqcqcqpqS
+++−
−−−+−=α  
It is exactly the probability of audit the buyer will employ. Note that the larger the 
penalty  is, the less frequent the buyer needs to conduct audit. UC dd +
From the FOC of the BA condition, we get: 
 (4)                                                                 ]))(([| kcqcqpqSd HHHHHHCLH =+−+π  
It indicates that the buyer’s gain from the audit equals the cost of the audit, so she should 
also be indifferent between auditing and not auditing given that the reported cost is high. 
Since LLH tf−= 1π , we know 
LL
LLL
LH tf
tff
−
−=
1|
π . Substituting it in equation (4), we get: 
(5)                                                           
]))(([
]))(([
kcqcqpqSdf
kcqcqpqSdf
t
HHHHHHCL
HHHHHHCL
L −+−+
−+−+=  
This is the probability the low-cost supplier chooses to be truthful based on the contract 
parameters. Note that when  approaches zero,  will approach 1, which means the 
supplier will not lie if the cost of audit for the buyer is infinitely small. 
k Lt
 Further substituting the (2) and (4) into the buyer’s objective function (1), the 
buyer’s problem is simplified into:  
(6)                                                                 ]}))(([)({
]}))(([)({max
,,,,
LLLLLLLLL
HHHHHHHHHdSSqq
cqcqpqSqqp
cqcqpqSqqp
CLHLH
+−−+
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subject to: 
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)(IR                                                                                               0))(( H≥− HHHH cqpqS  
)(IR                                                                                                    0))(( 'L≥− LLLL cqpqS  
Proposition 1.  In a contract with random audit, neither the high-cost nor the low-
cost supplier receives any informational rent.   
The updated problem indicates that neither high-cost agent nor the low-cost agent 
earns any informational rents under this contract, which means the two participation 
constraints are binding. The proof is simple: suppose the payoffs of the supplier under 
two cost states are larger than his reservation payoff, then the buyer could always lower 
her payment to him to achieve higher profit for herself.   
 With Proposition 1, it can also be shown that a supplier of high cost will never 
misreport his cost as low.  If the buyer audits with probability Hα , a supplier which is low 
cost is indifferent between cheating and telling truth following equation (2).  However, a 
supplier which is high cost will be strictly worse off by pretending to be of low cost.  In 
fact, he will have a payoff that is negative even when there is no penalty imposed. That is, 
)()[1(])()[1(0)( HLLHHLLLLLLLHHHHH ccqcqcqcpqScpqS −−=−+−−>=− αα  
Proposition 2.  In a contract with random audit, the production quantity assigned 
to low-cost supplier is optimal while the production quantity assigned to high-cost 
supplier is upwardly distorted. 
Proof. Substituting the two new constraints into the buyer’s objective function, the 
buyer’s problem is: 
(7)           )])(([
)(
)])(([
)(
max
, LLL
HHC
HHCL
HHH
HHC
HHCH
qq
cqpq
kcqd
kcqdf
cqpq
kcqd
cqdf
LH
−−+
−++−−+
+
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Note that the first-order condition for  shows Lq LLL cpqpq =+)(' , which means the 
price and the assigned quantity associated with low-cost supplier are both efficient with 
 and ,  where  and  are the first-best solution. The price and 
quantity associated with the high-cost supplier can be given by the following implicit 
function: 
∗= LL pp ∗= LL qq ∗Lp ∗Lq
0)])()('[
)(
)])(())(([
)( 2
=−+−+
++
−−−−+
HHHH
HHC
HHHC
HHHLLL
HHC
HH
cqpqpq
kqcd
fqcd
cqpqcqpq
kqcd
ckf
 
The first term of the left-hand side of the above equation is positive, the coefficient of the 
second-term of the left-hand side is also positive, so  must be negative to 
satisfy the equation.  It is then clear that 
HHH cppq −+'
HHH cpqpq <+)(' , so we know that  must 
be upwardly distorted from the optimal quantity . 
Hq
∗
Hq
3.3. Pure Strategies 
There are two possible pure strategy equilibria in this game: pooling equilibrium 
and separating equilibrium. The pooling equilibrium requires the supplier to choose the 
same contract (to report the same cost) despite his true cost type. The separating 
equilibrium requires the supplier to always choose different contracts (to report different 
costs) according to his true cost type. 
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The only possible pooling equilibrium is when both types of supplier report high 
cost12.  For this to be true, the buyer must never audit at all. The buyer will not audit only 
when her gain from the audit is smaller than her cost of audit. That is: 
(8)                                                      ]))(([
)1(
)1(
]))(([|
kcqcqpqSd
tff
tf
cqcqpqSd
HHHHHHC
LLH
LL
HHHHHHCLH
≤+−+−+
−=
+−+π
 
If the buyer never audits, the low-cost supplier will always lie, which means . 
Substituting into the above equation, we get:  
0=Lt
(9)                                                                            ])([ kcqcpqSdf HHHHHHCL ≤+−+  
When the cost of auditing is higher than the gain from auditing, the buyer will never audit. 
Accordingly, the low-cost supplier will always cheat. The belief and the strategy 
effectively form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.  
  Proposition 3.  When (9) is satisfied, there exists a pooling equilibrium for the 
audit game. The strategies of the game are: both high-cost and low-cost suppliers report 
high cost and the buyer never audits; the beliefs of the game are: seeing a high-cost report, 
the probability of the supplier being high-cost is ; the probability of seeing a low-cost 
report is 0. 
Hf
 The separating equilibrium requires the high-cost supplier to report high cost and 
low-cost supplier to report low cost. Thus the low-cost supplier should never cheat. For 
this to be true, the low-cost supplier’s payoff when he cheats must be smaller than his 
payoff when he tells truth. That is: 
(10)                                               ))(())(( LHHHHHHHLLLL cqcqcqpqScqpqS −+−≥−  
                                                 
12 It is not feasible for both types to report low cost, because the high-cost supplier will not be able to do it. 
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If the low-cost supplier does not have any incentive to cheat, we will have 1=Lt .  
Thus  0
)1(
)1(
| =−+
−=
LLH
LL
LH tff
tfπ  must be true, which means that the buyer believes that 
the all high cost reports are from high-cost supplier. As a result, the buyer will never 
audit, which is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The problem therefore transforms into the 
familiar hidden information model, where the Revelation Principle is triggered and no 
cheating or auditing will occur in equilibrium.  
Proposition 4. When (10) is satisfied, there exists a separating equilibrium for the 
auditing game. The strategies of the game are: the high-cost supplier always reports high 
cost and the low-cost supplier always reports low cost; the buyer never audits.  The 
beliefs of the game are: seeing a high-cost report, the probability of the supplier being 
high-cost is 1; seeing a low-cost report, the probability of the supplier being low-cost is 1.  
I also briefly present the pure incentive contract that complies with the Revelation 
Principle and does not involve any auditing, which has been shown above to be a pure 
strategy of the audit game discussed. The buyer offers a menu of contract 
 for the supplier to choose from. The incentive compatibility 
constraints in an ex-ante manner effectively prevent the supplier from cheating. The 
buyer’s problem is: 
{ ),();,( LLHH SqSq }
]}))(([
{]}))(([{max
,,,,,
LLLLLL
LLLHHHHHHHHHdSSqq
cqcqpqS
qpfcqcqpqSqpf
CLHLH
+−−
++−−α  
s.t. 
)(IR                                                                                                0))(( H≥− HHHH cqpqS  
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)(IR                                                                                                   0))(( L≥− LLLL cqpqS  
)(IC                                             ))(())(( LLHHHHHHHLLLL cqcqcqpqScqpqS −+−≥−  
)(IC                                               ))(())(( HHLLLLLLLHHHH cqcqcqpqScqpqS −+−≥−
 
 Please note that the ICL condition is simply the condition for the separating 
equilibrium to be true. The solution of the problem is also familiar:  is efficient while 
 is downwardly distorted.  In equilibrium, low-cost supplier picks a contract with 
higher sharing ratio than the high-cost supplier.  
Lq
Hq
 One intriguing aspect of the pure strategies is that no auditing is needed. The 
pooling equilibrium shows that the buyer does not bother with auditing because the cost 
of audit exceeds the gain from the audit. The separating equilibrium shows that the buyer 
does not need to audit because the supplier will not cheat anyway. It is only when both 
conditions for pooling equilibrium and separating equilibrium are violated, the result is 
the mixed strategy equilibrium that involves auditing as described in section 3.2.
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4. Comparison with the First-best and Deterministic Audit Contract 
 Now I compare the random audit contract with the first-best scenario and the 
deterministic audit contract to evaluate the welfare and validity of these contracts. 
4.1 Comparison with the First-best 
The first-best result can only be achieved when there is no informational problem. 
In the buyer-supplier setting described above, the buyer would know the exact cost type 
of the supplier and therefore offers a contract designed to him. No audit is needed. The 
buyer’s problem is therefore: 
]}))(([
)({]}))(([)({max
,,,
LLLLLL
LLLHHHHHHHHHSSqq
cqcqpqS
qqpfcqcqpqSqqpf
LHLH
+−
−++−−
 
subject to: 
)(IR                                                                                        0))(( H=− HHHH cqpqS  
)(IR                                                                                           0))(( L=− LLLL cqpqS  
Neither high-cost supplier nor low-cost supplier earns any rent, which means  and  
are both zero. The quantities assigned to the two types of supplier are also optimal. All 
surplus of the transaction goes to the buyer. The buyer’s gain is: 
HS LS
(11)                                                              )])(([)])(([ LLLLHHHH cqpqfcqpqf −+−  
 As demonstrated in section 3, the buyer’s payoff in the model with mixed strategy 
audit is:  
(7)              )])(([
)(
)])(([
)(
LLL
HHC
HHCL
HHH
HHC
HHCH cqpq
kcqd
kcqdf
cqpq
kcqd
cqdf −−+
−++−−+
+
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It also leaves both high-cost and low-cost supplier with zero rent. However, the quantity 
assigned to low-cost supplier is optimal while the quantity assigned to high-cost supplier 
is upwardly distorted. 
 As demonstrated before, 
)1(
))((
]))(([
LLHH
HHHHHHC
HHHHHHCH tff
kcqcqpqSd
cqcqpqSdf −+≡=−+−+
+−+ π  
LLL
HHHHHHC
HHHHHHCL tf
kcqcqpqSd
kcqcqpqSdf ≡=−+−+
−+−+ π
))((
]))(([
 
It is clear when approaches zero, k Hπ  will approach  and Hf Lπ  will approach .  The 
buyer’s payoff will get closer to the first-best result. We then have the next proposition: 
Lf
Proposition 5.  As the audit cost  decreases or as the penalty  increases, the 
buyer’s payoff approaches that of the first-best result. 
k Cd
The intuition is easy to understand: if the hidden information can be found out 
through inexpensive audits, then problem of informational asymmetry will simply 
evaporate.  Furthermore, if the penalty  imposed onto the supplier becomes infinitely 
high, the supplier will no longer “dare” cheat. 
Cd
 Please also note that  does not directly affect the buyer’s payoff. The 
uncollectible penalty only affects the probability of the buyer’s audit. However, since 
audit does not generate any revenue for the buyer through penalty collection, her final 
payoff is not changed. 
Ud
 From the above comparison between the mixed strategy audit contract and the 
first-best scenario, we see that audit contract with mixed strategy can outperform the 
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contract with pure strategies under certain circumstances13. This finding has significant 
empirical implication – the reason we observe cheating and auditing in business reality is 
perhaps because people play mixed strategies and the cost to eliminate the hidden 
information is also low enough.  
4.2. Comparison with Audit Contract with Deterministic Audit  
For the completeness of audit models, I also briefly present a model with 
deterministic audit with probability 1. This model is first used by Baron and Besanko 
(1984). Its key feature is that the buyer always audits the supplier as long as she sees 
high-cost being reported. Since high-cost production is 100% audited, the supplier will 
never cheat. Hence in equilibrium, the contract induces truth-telling so the penalty will 
never be collected. The buyer effectively designs a contract including audit as a 
monitoring tool that is incentive compatible.  
The problem facing the buyer is: 
]}))(([)({
}]))(([)({max
,,,,,
LLLLLLLLL
HHHHHHHHHHdSSqq
cqcqpqSqqpf
kcqcqpqSqqpf
CLHLH
+−−+
−+−− αα  
s.t. 
)(IR                                                                                            0))(( H≥− HHHH cqpqS  
)(IR                                                                                               0))(( L≥− LLLL cqpqS  
                                                 
13 The pure strategy separating equilibrium is simply the familiar incentive contract that complies with the 
Revelation Principle.  The fact that it can be outperformed under certain circumstances by a mixed strategy 
contract that does not comply with the Revelation Principle shows the limitation of the Revelation Principle.  
One assumption of the Revelation Principle is commitment.  When commitment cannot be guaranteed (as 
in most of the cases in real life), the Revelation Principle will not always hold.  The buyer-supplier scenario 
presented in this paper does not assume commitment of auditing, and pure strategies can be shown to be 
weakly dominated by the mixed strategy.  
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Again we know that the buyer will not audit a supplier that reports low cost, 
so 0=Lα . The ICH condition therefore collapses into the first. Compared to the pure 
strategy incentive model with separating equilibrium, we see that the use of audit further 
relaxes the incentive compatibility constraints. The larger the penalty  is, the 
easier the IC constraints are met.  
UC dd +
The IRH and the ICL constraints are binding. The solution shows that the buyer 
should offer a menu of contracts for the supplier to choose from, in which the margin  
for low cost supplier should be higher and the margin  for high cost supplier should be 
lower, which is also very similar to the separating equilibrium solution analyzed before.  
LS
HS
A major flaw of this model is the issue of commitment. The buyer has to commit 
to conduct audit whenever she sees a report of high-cost. If she always audits, the 
supplier will never cheat, that is, 1=Lt . However, if the supplier never cheats, the buyer 
does not have to audit all the time. She will be better off if she deviates from her auditing 
policy. The perfect Bayesian equilibrium cannot exist with this contradiction14.  
Proposition 6.  Supplier contract with deterministic probability of audit does not 
constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the audit game due to the conflict between 
game strategies and beliefs. 
                                                 
14 Some principals might be able to commit to this ex-post inefficient audit strategy because of reputational 
concerns (Khalil, 1997). For example, the government might have to audit its contractors as a public policy. 
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5. Comparative Statistics and Numerical Illustration 
 Proposition 5 shows that the buyer’s payoff increases as the audit cost  
decreases or as the penalty d  increases.  It is also interesting to see how the optimal 
contract parameters change when these two exogenous variables  and  change.  The 
solution to the random audit contract includes two sharing ratios  and  that are both 
zero and a production quantity assigned to the low-cost supplier  that is first-best, thus 
only the production quantity assigned to the high-cost supplier  truly varies with the 
exogenous variables.   I perform comparative static analysis to evaluate the relationships 
between q  and  and .  
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.  These results imply that 
the optimal production quantity assigned to a high-cost supplier  decreases with the 
penalty and increases with the audit cost . 
Hq
Cd k
 I further illustrate these relationships with a numerical example.  Suppose the 
product unit cost can be either $10 (high) with 30% probability or $5(low) with 70% 
probability.  The market demand takes a simple linear form qp 25.025 −= .  I will first 
set the audit cost to be $25 and collectible penalty to be $50.  These two values will be 
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varied later to show the induced changes in optimal production quantity for high-cost 
supplier and the buyer’s payoff.  The uncollectible penalty is also $50.   
 Substitute these numbers into the random audit contract, we can calculate that the 
optimal production quantity assigned to the low-cost supplier is 40 units and the 
corresponding final price is $15.  From the simulation, we also get that the optimal 
production quantity assigned to the high-cost supplier is 30.74 units and the 
corresponding final price is $ 17.32.  The buyer audits with a probability of around 38% 
and the low-cost supplier reports true cost with a probability of 97%.  The total profit of 
the project and the payoff to the buyer are $343.51, while both high-cost and low-cost 
suppliers’ payoffs are zero as they get zero share of the total profit.  
 Now I will increase the values of audit cost and collectible penalty to show the 
changes induced in optimal production quantity for high-cost supplier and the buyer’s 
payoff.  I will demonstrate the relations in figure 2 and figure 3.   
 We can see as the audit cost increases, the optimal quantity for high-cost supplier 
increases while the buyer’s payoff decreases; as the collectible penalty increases, the 
optimal quantity for high-cost supplier decreases while the buyer’s payoff increases.  The 
numerical example supports the comparative static analysis. 
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Figure 2. Graphic Illustration – Audit Cost 
(A) Change in Optimal Qty. for High-cost Supplier, (B) Change in Buyer’s Payoff 
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Figure 3. Graphic Illustration – Collectible Penalty 
(A) Change in Optimal Qty. for High-cost Supplier, (B) Change in Buyer’s Payoff 
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6. Extended Model with Moral Hazard Problem 
In a setting same as of the basic model, the supplier can also exert a certain 
amount of effort , which will further reduce the manufacturing cost of the product.  The 
effort stands for activities such as better engineering design, waste minimization or 
quality improvement.  Different from ,  is a type of “on-the-job consumption”.  If the 
supplier chooses to shirk, the buyer cannot verify it even at a cost.  The agent’s disutility 
for effort is .  The total cost of the production is 
e
e
c e
)(ev )( ecqC ii −= , where q  is still the 
quantity of the products being produced.  
For mathematical simplicity, I assume the buyer sells the product to a market with 
a linear demand function θ+−= bpaq  with  and  representing the 
uncontrollable fluctuation of the market. The inverse demand function is simply 
0>b ),0(~ 2σθ N
b
qap −+= θ .  The price and market demand are still assumed to be common knowledge 
for both the buyer and the supplier.  
The total contribution margin (or profit as I assume there is no fixed cost) of the 
project is )( ec
b
qaq +−−+θ .  The buyer is assumed to be risk-neutral, which means she 
simply maximizes expected profit. The supplier is risk averse with CARA utility 
function, , (xexu ρ−−=)( )0>ρ , where ρ  is the degree of risk-aversion and x  is the his 
monetary income.  The buyer and the supplier agree on a certain “profit-sharing” 
arrangement.  The buyer reimburses the cost the supplier reported, plus a percentage  
of the total profit made.  The payment to the supplier therefore takes the form 
S
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)()( ecqec
b
qaSq −++−−+θ .  Using the mean variance expression, we know the 
certainty equivalent of this payment to the supplier is 
222
2
)()( σρ qSecqec
b
qaSq −−++−− . The buyer retains the rest of the expected profit 
)()1()]()1[( ec
b
qaqSec
b
qaqSE +−−−=+−−+− θ .  The purpose of the profit-sharing 
arrangement is to provide incentives for the supplier to reduce the cost. The lower the 
cost of the product, the lower the price the buyer will set, and the more quantity will be 
sold to the end market.  
The problem facing the buyer is: 
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 The buyer’s objective function and the IRH, IRL, ST and BA conditions remain the 
same as that of the basic model.  The newly-added ICH and the ICL conditions indicate 
both the high-cost and low-cost supplier put in the amount of effort that makes his 
marginal cost equals marginal benefit.   
 Proposition 7.  With a moral hazard element as described above, the buyer has to 
offer sharing ratios higher than zero to both high-cost and low-cost supplier for optimal 
incentive and risk-sharing tradeoff.  The production quantity assigned to the low-cost 
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supplier is still optimal, while the production quantity assigned to the high-cost supplier 
is still upwardly distorted.  
Proof:  From the FOC of the ST condition, we get: 
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It indicates the low-cost supplier’s payoff if he is truthful equals his payoff if he cheats. 
As a result he should be indifferent between being truthful and cheating. The equation 
can also be written as the probability of audit the buyer will employ: 
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From the FOC of the BA condition, we get: 
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It indicates that the buyer’s gain from the audit equals the cost of the audit, so she should 
also be indifferent between auditing and not auditing given that the reported cost is high.  
Substituting 
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π  into the above equation, we get: 
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This is the probability the low-cost supplier chooses to be truthful based on the contract 
parameters.  Again please note that when  approaches zero,  will approach 1, which 
means the supplier will not lie if the cost of audit for the buyer is infinitely small. 
k Lt
 Substituting condition (ST ') into (IRL), we get: 
)(IR                                                     0)(
2
)( 'L
222 ≥−−+−− LLLLLLLL evqSecb
qaqS σρ  
Both (IRH) and (IRL') must be binding, otherwise the buyer could always lower her 
payment to the supplier to achieve higher profit for herself.  As a result, neither high-cost 
supplier nor the low-cost supplier earns any informational rents under this contract.  The 
supplier’s payoff simply equals his opportunity cost.   
From the FOC of the (ICH) condition, we get:  
)(IC                                                                                                       )(' 'HHHH qSev =  
Substitute (ST ') into (ICL), and solve for FOC, we get:  
)(IC                                                                                                         )(' 'LLLL qSev =  
Both FOCs show that the supplier puts in effort to make marginal effort equal his 
marginal gain.   
Also substitute (BA ')into the buyer’s original objective function, her problem is 
simplified into:  
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subject to: 
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)(IC                                                                                                       )(' 'HHHH qSev =  
)(IC                                                                                                         )(' 'LLLL qSev =  
 Substitute the four new conditions into the buyer’s objective function, we have: 
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The solutions (implicit solution for ) to the optimization problem are: Hq
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  We see the buyer can no longer give the supplier a sharing ratio that equals zero 
with moral hazard problem being present.  Still neither the high-cost nor the low-cost 
supplier earns any informational rent related to the cost information , but the non-zero 
sharing ratio is required to mitigate the incentive problem related to the effort .  Again 
the first-order condition for  shows the price and the assigned quantity associated with 
low-cost supplier are both optimal with  and ,  where  and  are the 
first-best solution.  The quantity associated with the high-cost supplier can be shown 
again to be upwardly distorted: the first term of the equation is positive as well as the 
ic
ie
Lq
∗= LL pp ∗= LL qq ∗Lp ∗Lq
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coefficient of the second term, which leaves )]([ HH
HH ec
b
q
b
qa −−−−  negative and 
shows  must be true.∗> HH qq
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7. Conclusions 
The purpose of this study is to present a simple profit-sharing contract involving 
private cost information and auditing in the context of buyer-supplier relationship within 
a supply chain. The audit game generates a mixed strategy and hence induces cheating 
and auditing in equilibrium. It is then contrasted with two other polar cases of contracts: 
contracts with zero audit and with deterministic audit.  I find that when audit cost is 
sufficiently low, the contract with mixed strategy audit will approach first-best result and 
thus outperforms the other two contracts. There is also a distortion of production level in 
the different audit contracts. However, unlike the familiar downward distortion of high-
cost supplier in the pure strategy incentive contract with zero audit, the high-cost 
supplier’s equilibrium production level will be upwardly distorted in the audit contract 
with random audit.  
When a moral hazard element is added to the problem, there is a new tradeoff to 
be resolved between optimal incentive and risk-sharing.  The buyer has to offer a sharing 
ratio that is bigger than zero to both the high-cost and the low-cost supplier. The 
production quantity assigned to the low-cost supplier remains optimal and the production 
quantity assigned to the high-cost supplier remains upwardly distorted. 
The major insights this study provides to supply chain practitioners are the 
comparison of different types of contracts. They are optimal only under certain 
circumstances respectively.  If the buyer cannot make any credible commitment to audit, 
random audit leaves her best off.  The results of the study can also be generalized to other 
contexts such as managerial compensation and corporate governance.  They provide 
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some explanation why the principals in those contexts adopt random audit mechanism to 
suit their needs.  This paper also suggests testable hypotheses for potential empirical 
studies. For example, the cost of audit and the amount of penalty should both be 
negatively correlated with the use of audit.  
This study can be extended in several ways.  One potential extension is imperfect 
auditing. In the current model, audit reveals the true cost with 100% probability.  
However, the probability of truth being found is often a function of the audit cost.  It 
would be interesting to build the audit cost as an endogenous variable instead of an 
exogenous one.  Another possible extension is with the penalty, which is another variable 
that can be set as endogenous.  For example, the buyer might require the supplier to 
return his “cheating profit” if he is found misreporting instead of an exogenously fixed 
amount.  The third extension possibility is to consider a game with more than two cost 
types.  It would be interesting to see whether there are new equilibria emerging such as 
partial pooling or partial separating equilibrium.
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